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Once More on (the Lightness of) Postcolonial Naming:
Which Europe and Whose Eurocentrism?
Kristine Suna-Koro, Xavier University
sunakorok@xavier.edu
“What is Europe? It is the Bible and the Greeks”1 – thus curiously suggests Emmanuel
Levinas, the magisterial advocate of ethics as first philosophy of late Western modernity.

1

Emmanuel Levinas, “The Bible and the Greeks” in In the Time of the Nations (Michael B.
Smith, trans., London: The Athlon Press, 2001): 133. “The Bible” for Levinas signifies the
imperative ethical impetus of Judeo-Christian religious traditions and “the Greeks” represent the
“vocabulary, grammar and wisdom with which it originated in Hellas, the manner in which the
universality of the West is expressed, or tries to express itself – rising above the local
particularism of the quaint, traditional, poetic or religious. It is a language without prejudice …”
134-135.
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Of course, from more than one location of enunciation, including the deep internal
peripheries (such as the Baltic region) of Europe as a geopolitical and not just
metaphorical entity, a sweeping yet reductive pronouncement like this might beg more
than one question. The poetic poise of Levinas’ “Europe” resonates with a spectrum of
historically embedded ethical questions, especially when Europe is named and theorized
in the field of discourses comprising postcolonial criticism. And postcolonial criticism is
itself not exactly a bystander in all matters ethical, at least in declamatory if not always
performative ways. In this context, my essay is an interrogation of the casual and
repetitive usages of the metaphorical construct “Europe” in postcolonial discourses as a
matter of the ethics (and politics) of postcolonial recognition. Considering the historical
context of an intra-European “underside” of pretty much everything – the Baltic region –
the objective of the present essay is to search for an ethically vectored complexity curve
in postcolonial naming.
It is hard to find a text originating out of the milieu of postcolonial criticism in
which the terms “Europe/European” and “Eurocentrism” would not populate the pages.
As theological inquiry of various positionalities and disciplinary domiciles is getting
more adept in applying postcolonial critiques to theological topics, terms like “Europe/
European” and “Eurocentrism” increasingly appear in theological texts as well. Against
the best scholarly instincts, it does not seem conductive or even feasible to quote the
scores of specific examples right away simply because they are virtually ubiquitous. The
critical purchase of inquiring into the usages of “Europe” in postcolonial discourses is to
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interrogate some rather resilient patterns of postcolonial representations/construals of
“Europe” from a perspective of the ethics of representation.
My inquiry, therefore, has a twofold focus: first, it is underwritten by a historical
suspicion toward the casual usage of homogenized thematizations of Europe in
postcolonial and subaltern discourses, be they theoretical or explicitly theological.
Second, it is sparked by a suspicion toward a certain “unbearable lightness” of
postcolonial naming (to paraphrase the title of Milan Kundera’s famous novel The
Unbearable Lightness of Being). This kind of “lightness” in postcolonial naming
overlooks precisely some of those geopolitical, cultural, and linguistic minoritarian
“others” in all their multilayered historical materiality, on whose behalf – or on whose
shoulders? – the whole theoretical industry of postcolonial criticism has been
successfully produced. The present inquiry is vectored toward the clandestine appeal that
reductive representations continue to exert all the while such an appeal is seemingly
being resisted, contested, and condemned. It does not seem to be the case that the casual
use of the metaphorically saturated figure of “Europe” would essentialize and
homogenize the geohistorical Europe deliberately, violently, or with a malicious intent.
But it nevertheless robotically proliferates the identification between the colonial and
hegemonic West/Occident/Abendländer on the one hand and Europe as geopolitical
region and geocultural formation on the other. In the North American context, such an
injudicious identification additionally serves to undermine pedagogical efforts to generate
adequate discernment of historical movements and cultural particularities of other
continents and cultures amidst the often oblivious consciousness of introspective selfJournal of Postcolonial Theory and Theology
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sufficiency – cultural, linguistic, military, economical and so forth – particularly in the
United States.

Europe: Metaphor, Cliché, Codeword?
In postcolonial criticism Europe has typically functioned not primarily as a
geopolitical entity but rather as, in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s words, “an imaginary figure that
remains deeply embedded in clichéd and shorthand forms in some everyday habits of
thought.” 2 True, on some level, there is a well-grounded critical awareness that “Europe”
is often conceived in hyperreal terms with indeterminate geographical referents.3 When
so conceived, “Europe” becomes a conceptual and imaginative placeholder for the
globally projected colonial power of Western modernity. As such, the shorthand “Europe”
is made to stand for what Barnor Hesse aptly describes as the “Western spectacle” – “a
discursive organization of an imaginary social representativeness that rests on a cultivated
social exclusiveness.”4 The Western spectacle functions by globalizing the
‘non-European’ (‘non-white’) other, outside the chosen people, as irredeemably
deficient, deviant and disorderly. Invariably narrowly cast as an outsider, an
inferior, a threat, a margin, an amusement, an exoticism, an after-thought; the
‘non-European’ as ‘non-white’, and vice-versa, is situated within the imperial
vision and governmental landscape of an idealized Western panorama and
paranoia. 5
2

Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000): 4. Italics found in the original text.
3

Ibid., 27.

4

Barnor Hesse, “Reviewing the Western Spectacle: Reflexive Globalization through the Black
Diaspora,” Global Futures: Migration, Environment and Globalization (Avtar Brah, Mary J.
Hickman, Martin MacGhaill, eds.; New York: Palgrave, 1999):130-131.
5

Ibid.
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Again, as handy and as habitual as the shorthand may be, there is an awareness that it
“dissolves under analysis.”6 At the same time, however, the analytical dissolution does
not mean disappearance:
… just as the phenomenon of Orientalism does not disappear simply because
some of us have now attained a critical awareness of it, similarly a certain
version of “Europe,” reified and celebrated in the phenomenal world of everyday
relationships of power as the scene of the birth of the modern, continues to
dominate the discourse of history. Analysis does not make it go away.7

Now the subdued situation that Chakrabarty so insightfully describes has supported the
reinscriptions of certain margins and of certain versions of subalternity ever deeper in the
cherished postcolonial canonicity while curiously excluding, nay appearing oblivious
toward, others. That, to allude to my final reflections in this essay, instigates a tendency
to conjure static, unproductive, and ultimately treacherous hierarchies of marginality and
subalternity and even worse, of human suffering tout court. Moreover, the state of
theoretical affairs that Chakrabarty has summarized may even raise the question whether
my analysis is a priori doomed to be superfluous. However, being aware of the
unpredictable and often fragile transformative reach of emancipatory theories and
liberating imagination, I agree with Salman Rushdie that imagination is not a frivolous
space, time and activity but rather it is a place where we “bring the world to being.”8
Theory, reflection, imagination, in other words, is praxis, too. It bodies forth betwixt and

6

Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 28.

7

Ibid.

8

I am referring to Salman Rushdie’s remarks delivered at “The Only Subject is Love: A
Symposium with Salman Rushdie, Christopher Hitchens, and Deepa Mehta,” on February 26,
2010, at Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA.
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between other praxes of living in the world of labor, enjoyment, politics, and
relationships without necessarily reigning over them. Thus, asking certain postcolonially
colored ethical questions may be useful to facilitate if not the disappearance of reified and
misleading “shorthand forms” then at least rendering the use of them explicitly selfconscious, selective, and hesitant. Theology, in this context, may offer an imaginary of a
very complex and fragile hope as a way of moving beyond reified shorthands and clichés
of the world of colonial power and enduring imperial formations in life and thought.
Hope, of course, is by no means an instrumental optimism. In these circumstances the
notion of the eschatological memoria passionis (Johann Baptist Metz) appears to be
useful. But first things first.

Europe: Sifting Through the Postcolonial Cliché and Shorthand
Why bother with pesky nuances? Namely, why certain historical clichés and
shorthand may be politically offensive and culturally trivializing (to some Europeans at
least) when it is so often assumed that the hegemonic Europe of Western colonial
modernity is the same Europe that is and has been for centuries the geographical and
cultural home of many surprisingly entangled histories, ethnicities, religious traditions,
and mostly unrecognized intra-continental colonial conquests? Because significant parts
of what is known as Europe today – all those dearly beloved and often bloody internal
queries about what starts and ends where in Europe notwithstanding – have not been
participating in the campaigns of the modern colonial aggression overseas, which is, no
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doubt, the magisterial and paradigmatic case of colonialism within postcolonial criticism
as we know it.9
What needs to be said upfront is that the historical non-participation of certain
Eastern, Central, Southern and Western European nations and peoples in the “discovery”
and conquest of transmarine colonies does not automatically entail the absence of
colonial desires. It does not automatically suggest a sustained resistance against
colonialist ideologies and rationalities as those were coercively projected onto other,
extra-European, cultures and territories. Yet the problem at hand in contemporary
postcolonial discourse is the (non)recognition of the burden of complexity inherent in the
representations of Europe as homogenized and unified originary locus of transmarine
colonialisms vis-à-vis the histories of European intracontinental colonialisms. For
postcolonial enterprise such an oversight cannot be an issue of mere historical accuracy
alone; it is that too, but most urgently it is rather an ethically circumscribed theoretical
conundrum.
To state a glaring example of routinely ignored intra-European colonialism, the
temporal range of these “domestic” colonial escapades stretches from the medieval
crusades into the territories of the Baltic rim to the often plainly ignored colonial
conquests and imperial dominance of the Soviet empire up until only a little over 20
9

R.S. Sugirtharajah has even stated that postcolonialism, as the term is used in present, “does not
allow an understanding of colonialism outside modern European colonialism,” Postcolonial
Criticism and Biblical Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 12. The vague
adjective “European” is rather unhelpful here even though it hints at the classical postcolonial
perception of the coloniality of modern power most closely associated with assorted European
colonial cultures.

Journal of Postcolonial Theory and Theology
Volume 1, Issue 4 (December 2010)
©Sopher Press (contact info@postcolonialjournal.com)
Page 7 of 58

8
years ago. Admittedly, when the contextual attention turns to the Baltic region, it must
tune in to one of the “small voices of history.”10 As disillusioned as one may be, in light
of Chakrabarty’s remarks, about the transformative capacity of historical analysis, the
aspiration here is what Ranajit Guha described as the power of the small voices of history
to interrupt “the telling in the dominant version, breaking up its storyline and making a
mess of its plot.”11 With so much due attention being directed toward the analysis of
exclusion in postcolonial milieu perhaps the time has come to focus rather intently on the
postcolonial politics of inclusion and recognition of previously overlooked complexities.
The aim here is to make the monolithically grasped “Europe,” the apparent slam-dunkcase of postcolonial theorizing and naming, a little messier. The itinerary of interruption
will proceed through the Baltics as an obdurate interstice of Europe. The Baltics,
however, is by far not the only such interstice in Europe – and this must be acknowledged
at once and a priori.
The Baltic region is one of the interruptive “nuances” within Europe as a multitiered configuration of powers and rationalities in the colonial context. It is precisely as a
nuance that it should merit a postcolonial attention since, as Ella Shohat argued in her
famous essay almost two decades ago,
the term ‘post-colonial’ would be more precise, therefore, if articulated as ‘postFirst/Third Worlds theory,’ or ‘post-anti-colonial critique,’ as a movement beyond
a relatively binaristic, fixed and stable mapping of power relations between

10

Ranajit Guha, “The Small Voice of History,” Subaltern Studies IX: Writings on South Asian
History and Society (Shahid Amin and Dipesh Chakrabarty, eds.; Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1996): 1-12.
11

Ibid., 12.
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‘colonizer/colonized’ and ‘center/periphery’. Such rearticulations suggest a more
nuanced discourse, which allows for movement, mobility and fluidity.12

What could be the critical purchase of interrogating the notion of Europe with an
interstitially nuanced vision, i.e., hearing one of those disrupting “small voices”? It has
something to do with ethics, or, in other words, with the testing of the endurance and
commitment of the postcolonial desires to embrace the ethical in its deconstructive and
representational practices and their aptitude for resisting what Barnor Hesse calls “de/
colonial fantasies.”13 And postcolonialism has much to do with ethics and justice – or
lack thereof. Thus Homi Bhabha magisterially stated that
postcoloniality, for its part, is a salutary reminder of the persistent ‘neo-colonial”
relations with the ‘new’ world order and multinational division of labour. Such a
perspective enables the authentication of histories of exploitation and the
evolution of strategies of resistance. Beyond this, postcolonial critique bears
witness to those countries and communities – in the North and the South, urban
and rural – constituted, if I may coin a phrase, “otherwise than modernity.” 14

12

Ella Shohat, “Notes on the ‘Post-Colonial,’” Social Text, 31/32 (1992): 108.

13

Barnor Hesse, “Forgotten Like a Bad Dream: Atlantic Slavery and the Ethics of Postcolonial
Memory,” Relocating Postcolonialism (David Theo Goldberg and Ato Quayson, eds.; Oxford:
Blackwell, 2002):159-160. De/colonial fantasy for Hesse is fabricated by “those Western
attitudes, practices and discourses that imagine against the evidence, against counterinterrogation” (159) and which is stimulated by a compulsion to imagine one’s current “postcolonial” situation as having resolved or avoided any disruptive legacies of the failures to
decolonize (160). Hesse primarily emphasizes the Western compulsions, even though his analysis
can certainly be interpreted to include a much broader terrain – even the terrain of
postcolonialism itself.
14

Homi K. Bhabha, “Introduction”, The Location of Culture, Reprint edition (London and New
York: Routledge, 2006): 9.
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From Bhabha’s finely nuanced perspective, the ethical diapason of witness – by
intervention in and revision of colonialist discourses – encompasses broad terrains of
subjugation and subalternity:
Postcolonial criticism bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of cultural
representation involved in the contest for political and social authority within the
modern world order. Postcolonial perspectives emerge from the colonial
testimony of Third World countries and the discourses of ‘minorities’ within the
geopolitical divisions of East and West, North and South. They intervene in those
ideological discourses of modernity that attempt to give a hegemonic ‘normality’
to the uneven development and the differential, often disadvantaged histories of
nations, races, communities, peoples.15

It is within the above trajectories of postcolonial ethos that the relevance of interrogating
the cliché-ic “Europe” obtains as an ethical objective for postcolonial critical endeavors.

Which Europe: One, Eurocentrist, Manichean?
It comes as no surprise that there is no surplus of elaborate “thick” descriptions of
Europe/Eurocentrism in most postcolonial texts. The trend can be detected already in
Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth – a work that is not, strictly speaking,
“postcolonial” but nevertheless exerts a magisterial genealogical influence in the field. In
Fanon’s book it is not only the passionate “Conclusion” in which Europe features
prominently as a monolithic and self-identical hegemony on the cusp of its downfall that
merits attention. Fanon’s “Europe” makes frequent appearances all through the book and
virtually everywhere it appears as a singular, seemingly transparent, entity: “the European

15

Ibid., “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern”, pp. 245-246.
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sector,”16 “European opulence,”17 “European culture,”18 to mention only a few instances.
When Fanon actually turns to the more specific “European nations”19 the same broad
strokes continue, inducing the question – which nations are then part of this “Europe”?
Which “nations achieved the national unity at a time when the national bourgeoisies has
concentrated most of the wealth in their own hands?”20 In which Europe “because of the
nature of their development and progress, no nation really insulted the others?”21 To put it
bluntly, Fanon’s expressions are simplifications – particularly ironic in relation to his own
notion of Manicheanism – but also a trendsetting precedent of a certain unbearable
lightness of naming, to be observed in scores of later texts originating within the arena of
postcolonial criticism.
Another paradigmatic instance of homogenizing Europe with a long rhetorical
posteriority appears in Edward Said’s magisterial Orientalism. Here the case is more
subtle since at the very beginning Said already distinguishes between the type of relation
that France and Britain have had with the “Orient” as compared to Germany, Russia or
Switzerland, clearly indicating that “Orient” and “Orientalism” paradigmatically obtains
in “European Western experience.”22 Apart from repeating the freezing gestures of the
16

Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Richard Philcox, trans.; New York: Grove Press,
2004): 4.
17

Ibid., 53.

18

Ibid., 151.

19

Ibid., 52-53.

20

Ibid., 52.

21

Ibid., 53. Fanon’s italics.

22

Edward W. Said, “Introduction to Orientalism” in Relocating Postcolonialism, 71.
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binary East/West, Said nonetheless equates Europe with the West23 of which the “Orient”
is the contrasting imaginary and experience. Beyond doubt, the imaginaries such as
“Orient” and “Occident” are “man-made.”24 But if so, then Europe as identified with “the
West” is “man-made” as well. The terminological inertia of generalized, manageable, and
habitual singulars appears alongside Said’s careful and insightful analyses. For example,
what exactly are the “European culture”25 and “the European identity”26 in the singular?
Is it like European chocolate except that when one wants to savor it one needs to eat
either Belgian, or Swiss, or Latvian, or any other locally produced and distinctly tasting
chocolate? In the present context of undefeatable vexations with the “search for the soul
of Europe”27 within the recently expanded and economically battered European Union, a
notion like “European identity” is suspected to always have possessed the ambiguity of
an egalitarian hope mixed with deeply ingrained ideological fictions, and perhaps even
more than ever begs the curious question – when was this “European identity” in
singular?
More recently similarly curious slippages into a strangely uniform category of the
“European culture” make appearance even in such careful and attentive studies such as
23

Ibid., 71. Said writes, “in addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its
contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.”
24

Ibid., 74.

25

Ibid., 73, 76.

26

Ibid.,76.

27

For an interesting, though postcolonially color-blind, theological reflection, see Richard H.
Roberts’ “The construals of ‘Europe’: religion, theology and the problematic of modernity,”
Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity (Paul Heelas, ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998): 186-217.
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Ania Loomba’s Colonialism/Postcolonialism.28 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak puts the case
rather clearly and states the obvious: the codename “West” represents Northwestern
European tradition 29 and that is what postcolonial thinkers usually have in mind, at least
when pressed, when “Europe” as a master signifier of colonial regime makes its
appearances in postcolonial texts. This is an awkward acknowledgment of G. W. F.
Hegel’s idea, who in Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte pointedly
identifies “das Herz Europas” or the “Mittelpunkt” of Europe as the Northwestern
regions to the north of the Alps to be distinguished from the Southern parts like Italy and
Greece and from the Northeastern, mostly Slavic as Hegel saw them, regions. 30 The
Hegelian “center” (das Herz Europas, der Mittelpunkt) of Europe unsurprisingly consists
of France, Germany and England. These three, however, are described as the most
important countries (die Hauptlaender) within “the heart,” indicating that there is yet
another, interior hierarchy even within the posited center.31 For Hegel, it is here that the
Weltgeist has found not just a temporary home – as it was the case with Greece and Italy
before the Reformation – but its consummation. Even more ironically, Donald Rumsfeld
captured the same uncomfortable imaginary of multi-tiered Europe with a characteristic
bluntness when he referred to roughly the same region where Hegel found his Herz
28 Ania

Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, Reprint edition (London and New York:
Routledge, 2005): 85, 94.
29

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the
Vanishing Present (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999): 6.
30

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke 12
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970): 133.
31

Ibid.
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Europas as the “Old Europe” of France and Germany vis-à-vis the “New Europe” of the
former Eastern Bloc among other contemporary maverick states of Europe in his
controversial remarks surrounding the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.32
Historically speaking, Hegel was by no means the only one wondering about das
Herz Europas from within the Enlightenment-inspired Northwestern European
metropolises. Before Hegel, Voltaire’s enlightened “discovery” of “Eastern Europe” in
Histoire de Charles XII (1731) not only worked out the “crucial eighteenth-century
demarcation of the continent into the domains of ‘Western Europe’ and ‘Eastern
Europe,’”33 but also posited the mature, self-congratulatory Western gaze, for which this
diffuse, awkward and backward terrain became l’orient de l’Europe. Obviously, a
significant and paternalizing asymmetry is established here by, ironically, “orientalizing”
gestures aimed at Europe itself, as Larry Wolf indicates. For Voltaire, “there was a Europe
that held certain beliefs, whether true or false, and another Europe which appeared only
as an object or regard, an item of news, a point of controversy. There was Europe as
subject and Europe as object, geographically aligned according to west and east, and the
former assumed a public persona in which it appropriated the latter.”34
At this juncture, the homogenizing theoretical gesture that Spivak alludes to when
she mentions the “codename West” needs to be explicitly recognized. Namely, Europe is

32

See, for example, “The outrage of ‘Old Europe’ remarks,” available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/2687403.stm among other sources.
33

Larry Wolf, “Voltaire’s Public and the Idea of Eastern Europe: Toward a Literary Sociology of
Continental Division,” Slavic Review 54:4 (1995): 933.
34

Ibid., 935.
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metaphorically identified with “the West/the Occident” – quite often in equally
essentialist terms – as the placeholder for what Hesse called the Western spectacle, or for
the colonial conquest and exploitation, or for the coercively projected political and
scientific modernity, and so forth. Spivak’s fleeting acknowledgment of the “codename
West” captures the collusion of historical, geopolitical entity and a cultural construct as
Stuart Hall suggested.35 In this context, the West/The Occident indeed “is a not a place, it
is a project”36 in Édouard Glissant’s words. Glissant and Hall’s laconic perception of the
West as a sociocultural and even theological construct is doubtlessly appropriate as a tool
of epistemological and cultural analysis to understand the present global scope of
modernity as cultural, scientific and economic imaginary. At the same time, Europe was
and is a geopolitical and existential reality for those who actually live there and have not
been enabled or willing participants of the oppressive colonial regimes that specific
historical European colonial powers tragically projected onto the cultures and peoples
outside and even inside Europe. Now to continue using homogenizing “codenames” to
casually identify a certain part, i.e., the Occidental or Northwestern Europe with the
whole of Europe is an ethically problematic gesture within precisely those postcolonial
trajectories of thought which, supposedly, pay more than a fleeting attention to nuance.
This collusion also renders the casually used notion of “Eurocentrism” theoretically
vacuous precisely because it ends up, willingly or accidentally, reinscribing certain
35

Stuart Hall, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,” Formations of Modernity (S. Hall
and B. Gieben, eds.; London: Polity Press 1992).
36

Édouard Glissant, “L’Occident n’est pas à l’ouest. Ce n’est pas un lieu, c’est un project,” Le
Discours antillais (Paris: Gallimard, 1997):14.
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presumptive and arrogant cultural constructs, demonstrated so well in Hegel’s
Vorlesungen, in the postcolonial context.
What about Eurocentrism? The theoretical trio of Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin
provide a classic entry on “Euro-centrism” in their dictionary of the key concepts of postcolonial studies: “Euro-centrism” is “the conscious or unconscious process in which
Europe and European cultural assumptions are constructed as, or assumed to be, the
normal, the natural or the universal.”37 Walter Mignolo alludes to the typical
understanding of Eurocentrism being a “metaphor to describe the coloniality of power
(which for Mignolo is the “conflict of knowledges and structures of power”38) from the
perspective of subalternity.”39 Of course, the subalternity in question here seems to be
automatically located outside the geographical Europe.
One of the most prolific and trailblazing postcolonial theologians Kwok Pui-lan
points out that “Eurocentrism means placing Europe at the center of attention, as the
focus of the production of knowledge and reference point with which to judge human
development and civilization of the world.”40 She shares the proposals of Dipesh
Chakrabarty to “reterritorize” and “provincialize” Europe, but the question in all these
cases is not about the rightly described and rightly deplorable modus operandi of
37

Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004): 90-91.
38

Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/ Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and
Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 16.
39

Ibid., 17.

40

Kwok Pui-lan, Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2005): 67.
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“Eurocentrism” as a distinct colonial cosmology of power but about the geo-political
pertinence of this modus operandi. What remains unclear in the above definitions is
which Europe is to be decentered or provincialized for cultural, economic, philosophical
and theological reasons? For there has never been and still is no one, single, uniformed,
transparent, and historically consistent Europe as the subject of perfectly matching
geographical, cultural, economic and ideological characteristics – either in the past or in
the present.
It is fairly obvious that to describe “centrism” is a much easier task: there is no
shortage of the evidence of colonialist aggressions from the glorified center of everything
that counts into the undeveloped peripheries that have been marshaled across the globe
triumphantly and bloodily, across the frontiers of subjugated cultures, knowledges, and
selfhoods in a largely unrepentant orgy of self-righteousness. But apart from at least a
theoretical illumination of the construed/assumed hegemonic center(ism), what about the
stubborn “Euro-” prefix? Here the inertia of the postmodern arbitrary production of
signification does not suffice unless an inverted Orientalistic construction of an
essentialized imaginary “Europe” is somehow deemed appropriate by critical (perhaps
ideological?) disregard.
Among postcolonial theorists, Robert J.C. Young has acknowledged this situation
and the “tendency of anti-eurocentric writing” which tends to “homogenize not just the
‘Third World’, but also the category of ‘the West’ as such” since “most forms of
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colonialism are after all, in the final analysis, colonialism.”41 Yet, such moves, out of
theoretical inertia or historical carelessness, continue down the road already much
traveled before. The ongoing use of the essentialized notion of “Europe” understood as an
equally homogenized “West” continues its tenure as one of those convenient intellectual
fixtures that Achille Mbembe has termed “lazy”42 and Deepika Bahri – “intransigent”43 –
categories. And, as postcolonial discourses become more commonplace in global
theological milieus, the lazy and intransigent “Europe/Eurocentrism” keeps up steady
appearances there as well. Consequently, the state of affairs that Fanon described as “the
Manicheanism of the colonist produces a Manicheanism of the colonized”44 is far more
resilient than the mega-voiced, mostly English-speaking, postcolonial discourses have
been willing to admit. In other words, whenever the notion of unqualified “Europe” or

41

Robert J.C. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (London and New
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“European …” or “Eurocentric” is encountered in postcolonial discourses, Fanon’s notion
of “a terrain already mapped out”45 should serve as a wake-up call.
In light of the above, the relevant critical question has an ethical slant: should
such homogenization continue as a virtually unchallenged trajectory of representation for
the sake of pedagogical manageability of the already dense postcolonial critiques? If the
lip-service is paid to the effect that there is a certain “awareness” that things are more
complex than just metaphorical clichés seem to suggest – is that sufficient especially for
those conjectures of postcolonial critical practices that detect an ethical constraint
involved in the particularly postcolonial politics of recognition of otherness? Such a
pragmatic consensus for pedagogical or whatever other reasons appears to be
theoretically blunt and inconsistent, I submit. Persevering and ethically fine-tuned
postcolonial analysis, on the contrary, would benefit from the sharpening of its critical
and creative eye through allowing itself to be interrupted by history when history and
particularly its “small voices” join “hands with literary criticism in search of the ethical
as it [history] interrupts the epistemological.”46
The small voices of convoluted postcolonial histories – and the Baltics is one of
them – exercise the function of what Gyanendra Pandey has termed “fragment”47 in the
enterprise of the historical interruption of the epistemological. The small voice or the
fragment, in this sense, is
45
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a disturbing element, a disturbance, a rupture… in the self-representation of
particular totalities and those who uncritically uphold them. The mark of the
fragment is that it resists the whole (the narrative). It cannot be assimilated into
the narrative and its claims to wholeness.48

A historical and cultural memory of the intra-european colonialism – that is, the memory
of being at the receiving end of it – can appropriately be appealed to to interrogate the
seduction of a reductionist postcolonial wholeness for such a forgetful wholeness and
completeness cannot fail but to “perpetuate the standpoint and privilege of those in
power.”49
So far I have listed the suspicions, inconsistencies, and grievances in relation. At
this juncture the question is – how would one speak of Europe from a particular
“difference within”50 Europe – from a locus of enunciation just outside the “Old Europe,”
from a diasporic space rooted in the Baltic region, and geographically far away from one
of its former transmarine colonies yet with a historical memory of having tasted its
colonial conquest inside Europe?

Once Again: Which Europe?
Enrique Dussel has claimed that the traditional Eurocentric fallacy of
understanding colonial modernity gravitates toward the presumption that “everything
occurred in Europe” as a purely intra-European phenomenon.51 According to Dussel, the
48
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modern, self-discovered and valorizing centrality of Europe is the outcome, and not the
cause, of the process of emergence of modernity through the “discovery”, conquest, and
colonization. Thus, the
birthdate of modernity is 1492, even though its gestation, like that of the fetus,
required a period of intrauterine growth. Whereas modernity gestated in the free,
creative medieval European cities, it came to birth in Europe’s confrontation with
the Other. By controlling, conquering, and violating the Other, Europe defined
itself as discoverer, conquistador, and colonizer of an alterity likewise
constitutive of modernity. Europe never discovered (des-cubierto) this Other as
Other but covered over (encubierto) the Other as part of the Same: i.e., Europe.
Modernity dawned in 1492 and with it the myth of a special kind of sacrificial
violence which eventually eclipsed whatever was non-European.52

Reflecting on Europe – not “the West” – it may be worth taking a closer look at the
“period of intrauterine growth.” Considering the “discovery” of the Baltic rim in the 11th
and 12th centuries, for example, I suggest that we are dealing rather with a case of ectopic
pregnancy in relation to the modern Western Europe (not simply Europe) as a
configuration of colonial powers. Parts of Europe were “discovered” rather than been
“discovering” and are therefore rather familiar with the mechanisms of “covering over,”
“eclipsing,” and making the Other into the Same. This, however, started long before
1492. Whether “gestation” obtains as a useful and non-reductive description for the birth
of modern Occident or Westernism/Westernness53 with all its connotations of an organic
and nurturing process remains highly suspicious from a Baltic perspective. Here are some
reasons as to why it remains so.
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In a recent study of the Baltic “discoveries” – and here I am looking deeper into
just one among many “differences within” Europe54 – Swedish historian Nils Blomkvist
suggests that “the High Medieval ‘Making of Europe’ was an effort of a magnitude
comparable to that of the Roman Empire, and mutatis mutandis to some extent to the
Early Modern European global expansion.”55 The region in question here is the Baltic
rim, the drainage basin of the Baltic Sea. The process of medieval continental expansion
included the typical dimensions of what evolved into the classic forms of colonialism –
the unholy “synergy of conquest, commerce, and Christ.”56 From 1147 onwards,
supported on the track of crusade by the popes from Eugenius III to Innocent IV57 to
Christianize the indigenous tribal lands and people of the Baltics, including the
indigenous Slavic peoples, the Northwestern European Christendom and its muscular
Teutonic Order executed the Christianization of the Livs, Curonians, Semigallians,

54
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Selonians, and Latgalians not only by fire and sword, but also through the collaborative
commercial efforts of the nascent Hanseatic League.58 As Christopher Tyerman notes,
The Baltic crusades acted as one element in a cruel process of Christianization
and Germanization, providing a religious gloss to ethnic cleansing and territorial
aggrandizement more blatant and, in places, more successful than anywhere
else.59

It ultimately led to the establishment of a crusader confederation of Livonia in the early
13th century through a military invasion and efficient appropriation of what are the
present territories of Latvia and Estonia. As Andrejs Plakans notes, “though ostensibly
fighting on behalf of the church, the Teutonic Order had its own material interests and it
was also a defender of the political interests in the area of the Holy Roman Empire.”60
During the 12th century “the Baltic world was not only discovered, but in a conclusive
way also penetrated and economically and politically integrated with Western Europe.”61
Historical analysis has led Blomkvist to observe:
The discovery of the Baltic belongs to the interval of 1075-1225, which can be
called the ‘long 12th century’. During these 150 years it was somehow decided
that people living in and around the Baltic were to become Europeans in the
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Western sense, while more eastern parts of the Viking world began disappearing
behind a cultural border. 62

Yet the process of “becoming European” was by no means an uncomplicated
“gestation” under the auspices of some grand narrative of unproblematic hybridity. First
of all, the intense cultural and linguistic diversity without a common unifying political or
economic purpose of the eastern Baltic Rim predates the arrival of the Northwestern
European crusaders and merchants. This fact is not lost in the Baltic region at present
despite the acknowledgment that the crusades were “a clash between two opposing
identities and watershed in the transformation of the local one.”63 Also, the establishment
of feudal and nominally Christian states in these indigenous and tribal territories – and
the significance and value of this fact again remains hotly disputed regarding the
historical, cultural, religious and ethical implications among the scholars in the region64 –
does not hide the dominating presence and efficacy of Dussel’s trinity of markers of
colonial modernity – control, conquest and violation of the other. By 1400 a system of
apartheid was functioning as a well-oiled mechanism through which “the nobility was
German in the present Latvia and Estonia, Polish or Polonized in Lithuania, while those
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who worked the fields were of various Slavonic, Baltic or Finno-Ugric ethnic groups.”65
The alliance of ecclesia and mercatura (the emergent trans-national commodity market in
Europe) produced in the Baltics a configuration of power which became
(…) an arena in which two entirely different groups of people lived together ; a
tiny, foreign elite, and a grey mass of barely Christianized ‘barbarians’, separated
by apartheid, constantly suspicious of and from time to time confronting each
other. The original aim of Christianization gradually failed. In the failure to
establish a functional state and the failure to merge into a nation, the European
making of Livonia produced one of the first examples of a social entity that was
later to be well known around the globe – the transmarine colony.66

As far as the “gestation” imaginary is concerned, indeed the Baltic frontiers
became Europe – violently, profitably, sporadically, and painfully. During this time the
attitudes of the Northwestern European religio-political self-righteousness matured into
the functional ideologies of modern colonial superiority. The Baltic frontiers were
“gestated” into Europe by crusade whereby the cultural imaginaries of the “discovered”
Baltic peoples took the typical route of producing nativistic cultural undercurrents for
centuries. These are by no means extinct at the present time. The historico-cultural and
religious memory of the geopolitical predicament “where two different breeds of people
coexisted: a tiny, European elite, and a mass of barely Christianized ‘barbarians’ kept in
apartheid”67 is well and alive in the present day Latvia, for instance. Contemporary

65

Blomkvist, Discovery of the Baltic, 14.

66

Ibid., 668. Blomkvist argues that “the invention of apartheid is perhaps thought to be one of the
many cruelties of the 20th century. It is not. The South African contribution was to formulate a
robust term for a long-standing Christian practice (…) – to keep various ethnic categories apart
… Apartheid is of course normality in all forms of colonial rule. One of the earliest clear cases is
Livonia …” 671.
67

Ibid., 704.

Journal of Postcolonial Theory and Theology
Volume 1, Issue 4 (December 2010)
©Sopher Press (contact info@postcolonialjournal.com)
Page 25 of 58

26
Latvian Christianity is inextricably overshadowed by the persistent cultural memory and
history of the colonial conquest.
Let me mention a case in point: in June 2009 a book burning of allegedly “pagan”
literature was instigated by a charismatic, predominantly Russian speaking, Christian
group “The New Generation” during the usually rambunctious Latvian indigenous
Midsummer celebrations (Jāņi) to mobilize against what they called the resurgent pagan
practices of occultism and fetishism associated with the Latvian ancient wisdom
traditions. Amidst the raging cultural controversy and public outrage about religious
intolerance, the Archbishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia Jānis Vanags
responded to these disturbing events in a widely publicized address. In it Vanags
underscored the enduring ambiguity that continues to surround Christianity as a colonial
phenomenon in the North-Eastern borderlands of Europe with an incisive, perhaps a bit
surprising for some, socio-historical observation:
However, Latvia is not a religiously monolithic country and Christians must
remember that they are not the only religious people here. Yes, Christians are
called to share their faith with others. Let us mention, however, that the greatest
harm to the Christian message in Latvia was not perpetrated by pagans, and
possibly not even by Communists, but by the crusaders who had presumed to
impose the good news of love by fire and sword. The wounds that they inflicted
have not yet been healing in many Latvian souls. Let us not resemble the
crusaders! 68

The postcolonial ambiguity regarding the original entrance of Christianity by “fire
and sword” undoubtedly continues to influence the palpable syncretism of the creolized
popular religiosity. Yet whatever the penultimate balance of gains and losses of
68
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Europeanization of the Baltic rim – and this continues to be debated rather passionately
among those Europeans formerly known as “barbarians” as well as among those
Europeans who once named them so – in the postcolonial imaginaries it is the “method in
the madness” that is important to consider. As Blomkvist sums it up, the eastern Baltic
Rim lands attracted the “discovering” gaze not only by possessing the most attractive
commodities of the time, but also by
the possibility of reaching cheaply exploitable peripheries by the superior means
of ship transport, rarely achieved elsewhere until the Portuguese exploration of
the South Atlantic began in the 15th century. This presented the peoples of the
Rim with particularly dramatic and decisive process of Europeanization, from
which they emerged as dependents of core area institutions and its culture in
general. In that sense, the Discovery of the Baltic stands out as a small-scale
rehearsal of what was to come in the Early Modern period.69

The model of “gestation” of the modern Europe here receives a corrective local
modulation through the theory of “small-scale rehearsal” before the 1492 premiere.
Robert Bartlett also points to the linkage between conquest, colonization, and
Christianization in the Baltics and the paradigmatic colonial modus operandi outside
Europe:
The European Christians who sailed to the coasts of the Americas, Asia and
Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries came from a society that was
already a colonizing society. Europe, initiator of one of the world’s major
processes of conquest, colonization and cultural transformation, was also the
product of one.70

Clearly, at least from the perspective of a “difference within,” the making of
Europe itself through the synergy of Christ, conquest, and commerce antedates 1492.
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This “Europeanized” (conquered) Europe as the center out of which the discoveries,
conquests and subjugations were projected upon the transmarine others has not exactly
been a monolithic, monochromatic center without profoundly repulsive undersides.
It is this usually forgotten genealogy of colonial modernity within Europe that
contextualizes David Chioni Moore’s critique of the dominant concepts of colonialism
and some of its rather curious imaginative stereotypes: “…what is puzzling about this
explanation [of what qualifies as colonialism] is not only how it seemingly ‘excuses’
brutality by adjacence but also how it grants off primacy to water.”71 In specifically
medieval and modern periods of history Europe was – and in certain aspects still is – a
small-scale “domestic” version of what ultimately became the modern transcontinental
colonialism with its global hierarchies of racial, cultural, economical and religious
superiority.
Testimonies to the “small-scale rehearsal” can still be found across the “New” or
“second (class)” Europe – which remains a very persistent and sadly resilient reality in
more than one sense. For example, it is witnessed to in the Latvian dainas, the lyrical
two-couplet folk songs, many of which were composed and transmitted orally during the
era of Voltaire and Hegel. Of course, to pay attention to these vehicles of cultural memory
is to assume that subaltern can speak, recognizing the variety of impingements ever
present in such speech. Over two million dainas have been now collected in written
format and according to Maruta Lietiņa Ray, at least 1300 of those reflect directly on the
71
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brutal life of apartheid and serfdom of the Latvian peasants, which lasted until the middle
of 19th century. 72 Lietiņa Ray argues that “in the interests of democratizing history,
validating the enserfed and enslaved experience of the Baltic peoples, and ending the
hegemony of history written by the colonizers, this voice should be added to the
historical record of the Baltics.”73 The dainas present a cultural and historical voice of the
colonized peasant-poets, predominantly women, speaking in their despised
Bauernsprache about the experience of both oppression and resistance. Serfdom or life as
a member of the indigenous Erbbauernstand entailed being a property of the German
speaking colonial nobility. Serfs were subjected to corporeal punishment or death,
deprived of personal property, deprived of the right to choose a spouse without the
master’s approval, while women we subjected to the droit du seigneur, and child labor
was the rule.74
Baltic German pastor August W. Hupel in his Topographische Nachrichten von
Lief-und Estland 1774-1781 notes that the Baltic peasants were not as expensive as
“Negroes in the American colonies” and “are sometimes sold or traded for other things –
horses, dogs, pipe bowls, etc.”75 Up until the so-called First National Awakening in the
middle of the19th century during the reign of the Russian emperor Alexander II and the
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gradual abolishment of serfdom in the Baltic provinces from 1816-1861, the dainas
presented the only possible form of lament, describing suffering, injustice, shame,
resentment, desire for revenge as well as sarcasm as resistance toward the Baltic German
colonial rulers inside the Russian empire. 76 Certainly the scope of the dainas is not
limited to the colonial engagement alone. Rather, the dainas attest to a poetically
engendered integrative world-view of the culture in the process of survival. They include
reflection on the matters of religion, nature, sexuality, afterlife and a version of virtue
ethics while struggling with realities of violence and namelessness. But the intraEuropean colonial division as attested to through the voices of the dainas – among other
subjugated knowledges of Europe – specifies the multi-tiered colonial dimensions of the
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content of Voltaire’s l’orient de l’Europe as the “other” close at hand, and yet invisible in
its perceived irrelevance of otherness.

Which Europe? The Stubborn Postcolonial Nuance Today
The polarizing divisions within Europe reflect the well-entrenched patterns of
obsession with self-congratulatory classifications of otherness. These are alive and well
today after the demise of the Communist colonial empire of the Soviet Union with all the
re-emerging versatility of the formerly dominated “Eastern Bloc” now being intensively
re-“discovered” as Eastern, Central, or Southern Europe, and as the “new others” of
African, Middle Eastern, and Asian migrations complicate the desire for neat and
transparent differences and boundaries. And then, of course, there is always the perennial
subaltern “other” of Europe – the Roma – constantly being forgotten even in the
postcolonial studies and sporadically (profitably?) “discovered.”
In the midst of this, there stubbornly persists a “disagreeable ‘Second World’”77 –
somewhere among the self-proclaimed “unity in diversity” provincial grand narrative,
ironically mimicking the unease around Europe as geocultural singularity precisely
because of its intra-colonial histories. Reflections on the same old trope of the “soul” or
the identity of Europe continue to disclose an inability (perhaps a pragmatic
unwillingness along the lines of a certain strategic essentialism?) to recognize historical
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disavowals. For example, the project of Redefining Europe78 offers a telling example of
how hierarchies of suffering/victimology are constructed:
The need for a possible redefinition of Europe certainly pivots on the May 1,
2004, admission of the ten accession states to the European Union. No longer is
the EU a Western European club. No longer are states and peoples formerly
victimized by Soviet imperialism illegitimate members of the European
community.79

Now after the collapse and after the altogether warranted condemnation of the Soviet
totalitarianism and imperialism throughout the cultural orbit of the Western political
postmodernity, it is certainly safe, gallant, and most importantly comparatively painless
to admit the victimized “second class/New Europeans” to the table of power brokering
after their ordeal under the Soviet imperialism. However, the antecedent histories of
Northwestern, “Old European” histories of victimization through conquest,
Christianization, and centuries of colonial apartheid are in the meantime comfortably
ignored. The victimology of the “redefined” Western European club undoubtedly points
the vector of indignation in a deserved direction as if to expiate its deeply ambiguous
dealings with the Soviet empire and its no less imperialistically bent successor. Yet the
newfound, premature indeed, wholeness of this post-Soviet world order is underwritten
by a historical memory too selective and too short for a postcolonial taste.
In view of Peter Nadas, the Schiller/Beethoven premise of “alle Menschen
werden Brüder” is not quite working in the post-Soviet Europe. Sure, the genealogy of
conflictual local histories is much more ancient than the unrelenting structuring
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presence of World War II and the specters of both Nazi and Soviet totalitarianisms in
Europe. Reflecting in the context of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, Nadas decried the de
facto	
  existence of “two entirely different Europes.”80 In the context of the more recent
“redefining” efforts and amidst the ongoing economic recession that has impacted the
“Old” and the “New” Europe in remarkably different ways, Nadas’ observation retains
its poignant insight: the “Old” Europe presents itself as a cultural formation that has
“preserved, still preserves, an angelic innocence and noble self-discipline.”81 To these
observations one might add an eerily Hegelian imaginary of the “Core Europe” or
Kerneuropa. It emerged during the aftermath of 9/11 from within prominent Western
European and North American intellectual circles, including Jacques Derrida and
Jürgen Habermas. The post-9/11, oppositional “Core Europe” debate again reinscribed
the well-known but profitably camouflaged intra-European “difference within.” But this
time around it was a de-romanticized Hegelian Herz of the “Old Europe” sans Britain.
This time around it was explicitly re-conceptualized as a mature and responsible “core”
in juxtaposition with the “infantile” and “dangerous” cultures of the Eastern Europe
which in their pragmatic support of the American invasion of Iraq were accused of
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failing to show their “European” maturity by frivolously missing, in Jacques Chirac’s
unforgettably notorious words, “a good opportunity to shut up.”82
A nuanced analysis of Europe and its polyphonic life-forms recently emerged in
Maija Kūle’s monograph Eirodzīve: Formas, Principi, Izjūtas 83 (Eurolife: Forms,
Principles, Sensations) in which the Latvian philosopher repeatedly comes back to the
image of mosaic84 as a useful metaphor for Europe. The history of Europe has
overwhelmingly been so diverse that the very question “is there such a thing as the
history of Europe?” remains ever legitimate Kūle argues. Clearly, “Europe as a
contemporary phenomenon is not identical with the West.”85 Hence, mosaic is a cautious
and multivalent image (even if a bit too benign or utopian for some explicitly
postcolonial tastes). It engenders the diversity and arguably, the assumed capacity of
Europe to be “united in diversity.” Of course, the crucial interrogation – postcolonially
and ethically – is about the nature of such unity and the measure of inequality, coercion,
82
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and imperialism involved, in the past as well as in the present. Here Kūle’s text shows
considerable hesitation toward sustained reflection on the issues of power, especially
colonial power, beyond a candid acknowledgement of the “European arrogance,” i.e.,
“Eurocentrism.”86 These significant and perhaps defensive (vis-à-vis the yet critically
unprocessed historical pain of the Baltic colonial histories in the locally produced
humanities and social sciences) occlusions notwithstanding, the image of mosaic
resonates with Nadas’ ambivalence about the (interrupted) reconciliation. It does so
especially from the perspective of hierarchical projection of geopolitical power in
Europe. On the other hand, the image of mosaic represents the fervent desire to imagine
and construct a righteous equilibrium of unity and solidarity. Kūle’s image of the mosaic
privileges an interconnected and interdependent difference, a difference of not simply
mechanical relation, but a difference of reciprocity and mutuality. Certainly there is quite
a bit of utopian air about it. Yet, the acknowledged but not sufficiently probed diversity is
allowed by Kūle to persist in interrupting the otherwise somewhat placid mosaic –
“diversity appears all the time, unity has to be achieved with effort.”87 Furthermore, for
her the structuring core of an European identity – if it makes sense to talk about such a
thing in singular – is precisely the lack of unified identity of the continent as a geocultural
imaginary too well aware of its own hierarchical diversity. Even though Kūle downplays
(prematurely, I suggest) the conflictual genealogies of this diversity, it is this diversity
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that constitutes the overarching context of attempting to name Europe attentively and
ethically from a postcolonial perspective:
To be a European means entertaining a different vision based on history,
traditions and habits. In France it means to think about Europe, which under the
leadership of France would preserve its French charm and the importance of the
French language. In Germany it means to continue dealing with the reunification
of the two Germanies, to repent of the Nazi past and turn against nationalism. To
be a European in Italy means to hold dear one’s family and nation. But to be a
European in Latvia, Lithuania, Scotland or Catalonia means to defend one’s
ethnicity and language, and to desire to be liberated from the influence of
Moscow, London or Madrid. To be a European in Finland means to travel to
Brussels and to lobby actively for the Finnish interests. The list could be
continued because everyone has their own experience, their own vision.
Therefore one must be careful not to transfer their particular understanding of
Europeanness to those whose perception of life is different.88

It is rather disappointing that Kūle, like many other philosophers and literary theorists
residing and working in the Baltics, steers clear of inquiring into the European colonial
nomenclatures of difference as having at least something to do with the peculiarities of
their own particular locus of enunciation. Yet her concern unmasks in a nutshell the
tremendous scope of differences that pertain to Europe as a cultural, political, religious,
racial, economic formation. Accordingly, it is the tremendous scope of “difference
within” that warrants temperance when it comes to naming Europe in singular – from
within and from without, from the “top-down” and from the “bottom-up” and certainly,
with a postcolonial twist to it out of elsewhere.
Kūle’s text points towards another particularity of theorizing Europe from within
the cultural milieu of the former “Second World.” There is no observable haste in the
contemporary Eastern European critical discourses, especially those originating from the
Baltic, to join the postcolonial club for various reasons. In the Latvian context, there is a
88
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growing sense of exhaustion regarding the invocations of more ancient colonial and more
recent totalitarian victimhood which are seen as politically and economically useless
today.89 At the same time, alongside an emerging field of thoughtful historical analyses of
the various colonial legacies, the cultural memory and perceptions of victimhood endure
as an ever agile and far from innocent instrument of political praxis and ideological
manipulation. Additionally, there is also a rather concerted effort to steer clear of what
Peter McCarthy calls the “new” or “pathological” marginalist disposition in cultural
criticism with its quest to presumptuously and metaphorically inscribe the theorist in the
actualities of marginal predicament.90 Instead, since the early 1990s up till now there has
been a rather emphatic academic and artistic culture of embracing the theoretical, literary,
and artistic paradigms of Western postmodernity with a vengeance that only the
“defrosted liberty”91 originating from a postcolonial context of a very peculiar
complexity can account for.
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The above attitudes accommodate frequent acknowledgments of the colonization
of the Baltic lands by various European empires until the First World War and then by the
Nazi and Soviet empires from 1940 until 1991 in a matter-of-fact manner in historical
research and political discourse in the Baltics despite the controversy about the Baltic and
Eastern Europe’s “eligibility” for postcolonial consideration in the Western academic
industry. On the other hand, however, the Baltic region has not so far generated sustained
engagements with postcolonial theories apart from sporadic scholarly engagements. The
essay collection Baltic Postcolonialism (2006) stands out as an exception, notably
representing the work of mostly diasporic and/or Western-trained scholars of Estonian,
Latvian, and Lithuanian origin. The volume reflects both the internal diversity of the
Baltic histories and colonial experiences as well as common trajectories. The essay
collection does not shirk away from explicitly connecting the ethical with the theoretical
in postcolonial discourses. It gravitates around the non-recognition of certain forms of
colonial exploitation as, so to speak, properly colonial – most notably the colonial
policies of the Soviet Union because of “the collusion of Marxism-Leninism and of
Western-Marxism”92 in postcolonial theory. Violeta Kelertas sums up the orientation so
conspicuously present in Maija Kūle’s Eirodzīve as well – which in itself reflects the rule
rather than exception in the Baltic theoretical discourses – thus:
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Usually it is the center which is accused of being Eurocentric, while in the postSoviet context the Baltic States perceive themselves as European and the Soviet
metropolis as uncivilized, barbarian and ‘Oriental’ (because of its allegedly
Mongolian roots – Ghenghis Khan and the invasions of the Golden Horde are
always mentioned as determinants of Soviet mentality). Instead of turning away
from Europe, the Balts generally turn toward it. Anti-European and especially
anti-Western and anti-American feelings surface only later, to be expressed in a
return to indigenous, mainly pagan roots, as tenuous and irrelevant to modern
city life as these may be.93

To exclude non-Western Europe from postcolonial discourse is a geopolitical gesture
resulting from “too narrow Western postcolonial and too parochial post-Soviet studies”94
argues Chioni Moore. Here the magisterial article “Notes of the ‘Post-Colonial’” by Ella
Shohat, which I have already referred to, is again a good example. For Shohat, the only
portion of the globe not pertinent to any type of postcolonial situation is the former
Communist segment, the bygone “Second World.” This excluding gesture toward the
former “Second World” remains as prominent now as it was two decades ago. At the end
of the first decade of the 21st century postcolonial theorists still are reluctant to
“recognize the postcolonial dynamic within the Second World. In addition, many
postcolonial scholars, in the United States and elsewhere, have been Marxist or strongly
on the left, and therefore have been absurdly reluctant to make the Soviet Union a
colonial villain on the scale of France or Britain.”95 Thus, Chioni Moore points out that in
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Shohat’s essay the decolonization of the occupied nations of the former USSR is
theorized in terms of a loss. 96
To reflect on the pertinence or perhaps even inflation of the term “postcolonial” to
include the vast post-Soviet segments of Europe is to question a methodological inertia. It
is about who prescribes the postcolonial normativity of certain discourses, concepts, and
rules of reasoning, rules of inclusion and exclusion. This is where the specters of
knowledge acquired and produced ethically – or not – touch upon the voluntary
association of postcolonial studies with the “ethical pre-text:” the ethical pre-text “is the
idea that postcolonial criticism is itself an ethical enterprise, pressing its claims in ways
that other theories such as those of postmodernism and poststructuralism do not.”97
Keeping in mind that “for Western postcolonialist scholarship to privilege the AngloFranco cases as the colonizing standard and to call the Russo-Soviet experiences
‘deviations’(…) is wrongly to perpetuate the already outdated centrality of the Western or
Anglo-Franco world,”98 the problem of naming too lightly only sharpens the recognition
of non-recognition of certain prolonged struggles for justice in the very theoretical field
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which is far from hesitant in admitting its “ethical pre-texts.” The “ethical pre-text” bears
most directly – even though often implicitly – on the inherent “object relations referenced
by the binary oppositions” so that the “destabilizations of the binaries are often proffered
as attempts at rectifying disorders in the extra-textual world of social relations.”99 Kwame
Anthony Appiah links the particularity of postcolonialism – vis-à-vis postmodernism – as
grounded precisely “in the appeal to an ethical universal” which is in turn grounded “in
an appeal to a certain simple respect for human suffering.”100 Thus, the postcolonial
challenge of the oppressive legitimating narratives across the interlinked terrains of
epistemological and cultural imagination all the way into political praxis of cohabitation,
recognition, and inclusion, proceeds “in the name of the suffering victims.”101
To pay no heed to the deeply ingrained interstices or the “difference within” of
colonial subjugation and terror in Europe – which is more than “the West” – is indeed to
name Europe “lightly,” to give up on the “ethical pre-text” and the “appeal to an ethical
universal,” as if the intra-continental colonial brutality were epiphenomenal or as if the
colonial “rehearsal” would entail less human suffering than the performance proper. What
is even worse, such a non-recognition risks fostering sinister efforts of fabricating
hierarchies of suffering and victimhood based on an essentialized conception of race and
99
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strangely valorized prominence of water as the marker of a “real” coloniality of power.
Such a proclivity facilitates precisely the proliferation and engorgement of the very
colonialist binaries that are to be so necessarily deconstructed, hybridized and modulated
into as many transformative “posts” as possible. In other words, the question about
representing Europe in postcolonial discourses is most emphatically not about Europe per
se; rather, it is stubbornly and repeatedly about all those beloved grand narratives and
seductions of a premature “wholeness or completeness”102 of postcolonialism that are
caught up in the transmigration of Manicheanisms without the ethical interruption of a
genuinely transcending, not just chronological, “post.” The question is about the palpable
cultural essentialism of ascriptive identities that are attributed by postcolonial theorists to
their historical and existential referents – and there are material and historical referents to
the figure and metaphors of postcolonial theory – from a distance in space, time,
language, cultural traditions. It comes as no surprise that postcolonial theorists working
out of Southeast Asian or West African cultural contexts within the Western academy
would experience a multifaceted distance from the cultural and historical contexts of the
“New” Europe – and vice versa. But as far as the genesis of ethically accountable
postcolonial critiques is concerned, neither those working out of the postcolonially
dominant Southeast Asian contexts nor those working out of postcolonially marginal
contexts such as Eastern Europe or Ireland should neglect the possibilities of
conversation across the distance – the distance that may not, after taking a closer and
more nuanced look, be as long and as alienating as it often appears in terms of racial,
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economical, religious, and cultural markers that pertain to the experienced varieties of
colonial subjugation. What is not useful for any critical and political purposes is the
proliferation of simplistically monochromatic and essentialist ideas that endure with the
typical ease of dualistic concepts.
On a practical plane, what difference could naming Europe with more attention to
the postcolonial “ethical pre-text” make? Which nuances could be added to mess up the
monochromatic postcolonial wholeness? In the present, qualifications as specific as
possible appear to be useful in their aspirations to represent the historical colonialisms
that developed in Europe from the long 12th century of the Baltic crusades onwards with a
little more ethical sensitivity and historical accuracy. If talking about the initial stages of
the transmarine colonial conquest it may be helpful to be as passionately contextual as
possible without, however, degenerating into the elitist solipsism of not speaking at all.
Deliberate use of qualifiers such as British, French, or Spanish colonialism might be
pertinent whenever the situation calls for concreteness. A qualifier such as “Occidental
Europe” might be appropriate to modulate the casual and vacuous usages of “Europe” in
postcolonial texts. What the adjective “Occidental” signals, when used in a thick
contextual manner, is what Hesse described as the “Western spectacle” or what Walter
Mignolo’s notion of “Occidentalism” as “the overarching metaphor of the modern/
colonial world system imaginary”103 refers to. Namely, Occidentalism or Westernism
refers to the hegemonic cosmologies of power and the dualistic hierarchies of value,
truth, and beauty that are typically implied in “Eurocentrism.” If Occidentalism or
103
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another qualifier is substituted for the glib “Eurocentrism,” such a representational shift
helps to modulate the homogenizing impulse and can foster a historically discerning
critical sensibility to advance precisely that “more nuanced” (Shohat) discourse that
postcolonialism aspired to be. An approach like this would encourage representations
with a pronounced postcolonial ethical sensitivity, that is, with a nuanced attention to the
historical materialities of injustice and the messy colonial “differences within” rather than
continued marching to the tune of inversed “Rule Britannia” – as when the whole
postcolonial field slants according to the prescriptive authority of theoretical voices
almost exclusively coming out of the former domains of the British colonial empire and,
to a lesser extent, of the French colonial empire.
Yet there is no unambiguous panacea to be recommended. Each and every
qualification can be most useful for certain loci of postcoloniality and not for others. To
use “Occidentalism” or “Westernism” instead of “Eurocentrism” can alleviate certain
linguistic injustices of the “lightness” in the politics of postcolonial recognition.
However, if used acontextually and carelessly, these terms can repeat the same reductive
gesture as the “Euro” in Eurocentrism: in other words, it can lead to the point where “the
metaphor is no longer noticed, and it is taken for the proper meaning.”104 In addition, as
Namsoon Kang succinctly puts it, “the West as a homogeneous whole exists only in
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imagination,”105 meaninglessly proliferating all sorts of “we-they binarism” along the
lines of the same old Orientalism.106
Moreover, “Westernism/Occidentalism” can simultaneously occlude even deeper
certain other experiences of colonialism in relation to Europe. To invoke the most
obvious example, Ireland remains a colonial affair not to be forgotten precisely as far to
the West of the “Occidental” Europe as possible, making the very qualifier “Occidental”
unstable by yet another deep and long occluded (post)colonial interstice or “difference
within” Europe. Thus, in resonance with the Baltic context, C.L. Innes draws attention to
the fact that “the Irish example complicates the usual postcolonial paradigms and
encourages us to think in terms of divisions which derive from class rather than race, and
which are more fluid than much postcolonial theory allows.”107 Thus terms like
“Occidental Europe,” “the West,” or “Occidentalism,” or “Westernism” should not be
mistaken for a theoretical slam-dunk that fits equally well all historical eras and colonial
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regimes.108 The qualifiers – when used in a doggedly contextual mode – can potentially
remind postcolonial theorists and theologians, once more with a feeling, to err on the side
of caution when theoretically neat imaginaries threaten to curve into clandestinely
ahistoric or purely textual modes of reasoning. On an explicitly theological note, like the
apophatic trajectory of naming and unnaming God to avoid presumptuous and reductive
naming of the ultimate mystery, the proliferation of contextual qualifiers in relation to
Europe – or any other complex historical subject – is an analogical way to avoid idolatry
in postcolonial terms. In addition, given the close genealogical relationship between the
high poststructuralist literary theory and postcolonialism, a slippage into a selfconsuming textuality can never be discounted. Staying as intimate as possible with the
messy historical materialities in the acts of postcolonial naming and conceptualizing, no
matter how steep, distant, and inconvenient the complexity curve may be, comprises an
ethically answerable mode of modulating the painful “lightness” of reductive naming in
postcolonial critiques – and thus also of resisting to render certain histories of suffering
even more invisible.
It is here that the critical value, I submit, of those small voices of history and of
those small interstitial locations of historical and political memory that are ritually “left
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behind” to drown among the traditional postcolonial megavoices resides. Again, my
appeals to historical attentiveness constitute no straightforward theoretical or political
panacea. The old questions that Guha asked so pointedly years ago – whose history
counts as history, who decides what counts as history and according to what values and
whose criteria109 – can be invoked again here by those historiographic narratives which
would adamantly oppose the particular “small voice” of interruption that I have posited
here as a challenge to certain, almost invisible, yet resilient and reductive imaginaries
within the contemporary postcolonial terrain. This is a question beyond the scope of the
present reflections. But, be that as it may, the small voices of history continue to remind
that any naming that reductively swoops a far-flung gaze over the unstandardizable
diversity of postcolonial situatedness of peoples, cultures, languages and histories indeed
borders on being unbearably light, regardless of what and who is on the receiving end of
such naming – Europe, Asia, the Americas, or Africa…

Questioning the Hierarchies of Victimhood: An Unscientific Postscript
To ponder over Europe as the origin and destination of colonial violence and
suffering at the first glance may seem illegitimate and offensive in the postcolonial
milieu. But taking a long look at Europe with attention to some of its usually neglected
“small voices” – this time out of the Baltics – is not about succumbing to an ideological
lure toward a revisionary cult of innocence as far as the non-participation of certain
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cultures and nations of Europe in the global colonial aggression of the Western modernity
is concerned. Non-participation of certain Europeans, or more precisely of certain
subaltern Europeans, in the colonial violence outside Europe is by no means a synonym
of their innocence. The experience of suffering oppression does not engender a
metaphysical immunity against becoming an oppressor.
Moreover, as Baltic Postcolonialism appropriately highlights it, the former
“Second World” or the “New” Europe has a rather complicated relationship with (post)
colonial innocence – if there is such a thing. As I already emphasized, most of the former
Soviet colonies have not shown any sustained interest in postcolonial discourses even
though the historical and cultural memories of colonial violence saturate the public and
intellectual space under many other headings. There are several profoundly ambivalent
reasons for being so aloof toward postcolonial criticism. Among these are also some
appalling reasons, including the well-internalized and scandalously projected
compensatory assumptions of racial and cultural superiority vis-à-vis a despised and
latently feared “Third World” as it continues to be associated, among other things, with
the Soviet empire that several essays in Baltic Postcolonialism refer to. In present day
Latvia it is hard to find anything more insulting than hearing comparisons of, say, Latvia
with a “developing” or “Third World” country in Africa or Asia. At the same time, and
particularly during the current economic crisis, the public space and cyberspace is
buzzing with apocalyptic self-castigations of these “New” Europeans. Interestingly, the
terms of choice to lament over the economic and political failures include bitter selfassessments such as “servant/slave nation” and “Banana republic” with clear allusions to
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the colonial subjugation and victimhood with the resulting backwardness and injustice.
These perceptions undermine productive solidarity with other postcolonial cultures and
locations. The desire to be “properly” European, i.e., “Western,” while realizing that the
postcolonial dynamic of hybridity and mimicry of “almost but not quite” frustratingly
obtains more often than not in Latvia’s dealings with the “Old” Europe as other political
powers near and far, is arguably a most fascinating and complex transitional phenomenon
in its political and cultural history – at least from a postcolonial perspective.
Let me mention another example. No less interesting is the widespread success of
the recent Latvian “tragi-comic” pop-Singspiel “Tobago!” It amply reveals both eerily
romanticized colonial desires and a perplexing oblivion regarding the collision of
differently colored and located subalternities. Produced by one of the most famous
contemporary Latvian poets Māra Zālīte and composer Uldis Marhilēvičs, “Tobago!” was
performed over several years with huge success at the Daile Theater in Rīga since it
premiered in 2001. The historical events surrounding the colonial escapades of the Dukes
of Kurzeme (Courland) into the Caribbean (Tobago) and West Africa (Gambia) in the 17th
century serve as the background for a love story played out among the Latvian serfs who
are dispatched overseas with their colonial masters to Tobago. They use the opportunity
to seek a possibility for a better, or at least a different, life for themselves. The outcome
of the adventure is tragic for a number of reasons, despite all the comic elements
scattered throughout the show. Yet the fact that the colonial history was a history of
aggression and invasion, and not simply a means of escaping their own constrictions of
apartheid and serfdom, seems not to occur for either the dramatis personae of the play or
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their creators. A few of the critical reviews pointed out this peculiarity, albeit in a very
fleeting manner.
This situation is not surprising. It is customary to link the fixation on the past
suffering with frenetic claims of victimhood as the master signifier of nativist discourses
that gravitate around “the wound that never heals,” as Achille Mbembe has put it.110 The
formation of identity in relation to the past yet sans fixation on that past, as Mbembe
suggests, can occur whenever there is a “capacity to put the past in parentheses” and
“open oneself to the present and the course of life.”111 Of course, the “opening” that
Mbembe proposes is not an elimination or, rather, a repression of the past and its
remembrance. But what could such “opening” mean if one considers a postcolonial
interstice such as Latvia in relation to naming Europe, naming that complex and
internally colonized and multi-tiered geopolitical and existential home of the conquerors
and the conquered, the “Europeanizers” and the “Europeanized”? What could a Baltic
interstitial perspective add most pointedly to the sensibilities and politics of postcolonial
naming and recognition?
Listening to these often ambiguous and indecisive “small voices” the conundrum
of naming gravitates around more nuanced and discerning practices of recognition of
human suffering precisely to delimit the proliferation of imaginaries of hierarchical
victimhood, sometimes even rather profitably crafted victimhood. Keeping the Baltic
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postcolonial interstices in mind, such practices and habits of imagination entail more
hesitation before being swept up in the lightness of naming inherent in routine
reinscriptions of certain margins, certain subalternities, certain subjugations as somehow
more valuable, more appropriate than others. Hesitation is mandated especially when it
comes to the theoretical issues of postcolonial canonicity – the production of the
hierarchical canonicity of certain oppressions, certain colonialisms, certain sufferings,
certain apartheids – while soaring far above other historical remembrances that don’t
immediately fit the terrain already mapped out. Audacity to take a road so far less
traveled starts by seriously, not accidentally or when pressed hard, paying attention to uncanonized cases of injustice and suffering. Such a practice of naming would be
instrumental to resist the vacuity of blasé assignments of (post)colonial innocence or guilt
tout court to any culture, geographical location, race, and religion, for as Hannah Arendt
warned long ago, when all are guilty, then no one really is.112 When all Europeans and all
European cultures and nations are responsible for colonial ideology and violence to an
equal degree, then no one really is. When the vague notion of “Eurocentrism” of so many
postcolonial critiques is used copiously but indiscriminately, it accomplishes little else
apart from ironically and relentlessly reinscribing the same old and jealously guarded das
Herz Europas as the only legitimate and fully civilized Europe as a Manichean center of
all that counts, even taking under its wing the rebellious North Atlantic mimicry of itself.
If race alone constitutes the canon of postcolonial attention, then there will certainly be
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quite a few preemptively discounted small voices of history that will fade even further
into – this time postcolonial – subalternity. This type of subalternity will continue to
speak, mostly to itself and about itself with endless and suffocating circularity, but will
not be heard elsewhere. If geographical location alone becomes the unwritten shibboleth
of postcolonial canonicity and legitimacy then the postcolonial aspiration toward nuanced
discourse starts appearing more and more as a mere façade of a geopolitically entrenched
Western academic sub-industry with a rather inconsequential regard toward self-declared
“ethical pre-texts” or “differences within.”
To remain loyal to the “ethical pre-text,” postcolonial imagination can usefully
focus on the historical materialities of human suffering as it is named non-hierarchically.
Namely, postcolonial imagination as the driving force of a “more nuanced discourse” can
modulate its conceptual range to recognize an analogical interval or an analogical
resonance among the multitude of keys in which pain and injustice, including colonial
violence and oppression of this world are scored. This analogical interval accommodates
a palimpsestic usage of critical categories such as race, ethnicity, gender, and class,
especially when it comes to human suffering of injustice. And the relentless polyvocality
of suffering is the only universal always worth being attentive to even in this arguably
“post-metaphysical” era so suspicious of all invocations of totality and universality.
At this junction, theology can fruitfully assist postcolonial imagination, I submit.
To remember the past usefully and to open up to the present complexities of global
conviviality a recourse to what Johann Baptist Metz called memoria passionis may be
particularly pertinent. Appealing explicitly to the Christian tradition from a constructive
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viewpoint in the postcolonial context may raise some postcolonial eyebrows. Keeping
that is mind, it is important to note that Metz’s memoria passionis is above all a
dangerous memory. Namely, Metz argues that the memoria passionis, mortis et
resurrectionis Jesu Christi is a subversively liberating memory, grounded in “the promise
of future freedom for all.”113 Far from being a “reactionary” category, an “opiate for the
present,” a “‘false consciousness’ of our past,” and finally a “bourgeois counterconception to hope,” the memory of suffering for Metz functions as a practical, critical
and “even dangerously emancipatory force.”114 Why? The subversive power of
remembered history of suffering, through the interpretive lens of the suffering and
victimized Christ, makes demands on the present as it resists any attempts to conscript by
some Aufhebung the histories of the the dead, the conquered, the victimized, the
vanquished, and the forgotten into the “History” of progress. The memoria passionis
Christi articulates itself as an ethical comportment that “makes one free to suffer from the
suffering of others and to respect the prophetic witness of other’s suffering.”115 This
comportment or as Metz calls it, “anamnestic reason/rationality,” obtains the character of
legitimate universality when it is guided by specific memory of suffering which is
however, not a form of “self-referential memory of suffering (the root of all conflicts!),
but in the form of a memory of others’ suffering, in the form of a remembrance of the

113

Johannes B. Metz, “The Future in the Memory of Suffering,” New Questions on God
(Johannes B. Metz, ed.; New York: Herder and Herder, 1972):18.
114

Ibid., 14.

115

Ibid., 19.

Journal of Postcolonial Theory and Theology
Volume 1, Issue 4 (December 2010)
©Sopher Press (contact info@postcolonialjournal.com)
Page 53 of 58

54
stranger’s suffering”116 besides one’s own. Therefore, as Metz suggests, memoria
passionis entails an “anamnetic solidarity or solidarity in memory with the dead and the
conquered which breaks the grip of history as a history of triumph and conquest
interpreted dialectically or as evolution.”117 Therein resides the dangerousness of
memoria passionis: it remembers more than itself and remembers without producing the
hierarchies of death and victimhood. Such a memoria passionis enables what, to slightly
paraphrase Anselm Min, 118 is best expressed as a solidarity of suffering others.
Certainly, Metz anticipates the charge – remember Arendt? – that memoria
passionis can be interpreted in the way that would make the actual historical suffering
vacuous by claiming a universal consolation that ultimately consoles no one, since all
suffer in a certain sense. To this, Metz’s answer is an emphatic “no.”119 Memoria
passionis is interwoven with the “catastrophic essence” of history with regard to its
forgotten, ruined, and disregarded victims and it demands that the “catastrophes must be
remembered with practical and political intent.”120 Memoria passionis is not a historical
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and theoretical voyeurism. It is the comportment of recognition, providing the space for
anamnestic and emancipator remembrance of many specific sufferings and injustices,
especially those which are so often deemed irrelevant and unworthy of acknowledgment.
Memoria passionis as a solidarity of historical suffering others invites an opening for
freedom from both the selective memories of self-aggrandizing pasts and from cruel
teleologies of human torment.
Thus the historically and “practically” remembered histories of suffering – and for
Metz there is never just a single history of suffering – are “dangerous” tools of not merely
resistance but also emancipation from injustice and oppression as they subvert the
temptations of any types of Aufhebung in order to still the past in a purely affirmative
attitude.121 Memoria passionis Christi here functions as a non-hierarchical interface, as a
space of rarely coveted solidarity, as a space in which various historical wretched and
useless of the earth can meet without immediately competing for the top prize in
victimhood. Within the interface of memoria passionis “vanquished and destroyed
alternatives would also be taken into account”122 and yet a political enthronement of any
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classical or canonized cases of suffering, including the memoria passionis Christi itself,
is stubbornly refused.123
Memoria passionis is not solely an imaginary of remembrance per se. As Metz
reminds again and again, it is an eschatological remembrance. It is a memoria passionis
et resurrectionis. But there is no resurrection in any sense without the full
acknowledgment of the suffering. The dangerous memory in its eschatological aspect
stubbornly keeps reminding all that there is a hope for “the useless of the earth” under the
eschatological proviso of God – under which there might just be enough courage to risk
a genuine historical consciousness of “looking into the abyss”124 of suffering nonvoyeuristically.
In this sense it is an anticipatory, indeed utopian, memory if a less theological
term would be helpful here. Namely, as Metz suggests, “it intends the anticipation of a
particular future of man as a future for the suffering, the hopeless, the oppressed, the
injured and the useless of this earth.”125 In the ongoing struggle for memories, the
eschatological memoria passionis et resurrectionis persists in listening to the small voices
of history as they create enough room to recall
not only the successful but the ruined, not only that which been realized but that
which has been lost, a memory that in this way – as dangerous memory – resists
identifying meaning and truth with the victory of what has come into being and
continues to exist.126
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From a vantage point of memoria passionis, mortis, et resurrectionis Jesu Christi,
especially in postcolonial context, the whole history of Christianity as a lived religious
tradition, having so often succumbed to and even incited the temptations of the unholy
colonial synergy of Christ, conquest, and commerce, stands under indictment – among
other indictments. Instead of remembering the vanquished and the ruined practically and
politically, Christianity has often been an instrument of multiplying the numbers of the
useless of the earth. And yet memoria passionis, equally dangerous internally (within
Christianity) and externally (wherever Christians deal with the “others”) – precisely as
long as it remains dangerously loyal to its original revelation despite all perversions past
and yet to come – it is still capable of bringing newness into moral and political
imagination with a hope, in Metz’s words, that it would “mature into a generous,
uncalculating partisanship of behalf of the weak and unrepresented.”127
What would such an uncalculating partisanship look like in the business of
postcolonial politics of naming and recognition? I submit, it would look like
remembrance without exclusive fixation on “canonized” cases of suffering alone, on
“classical” margins alone, on the loudest and most contrastive minorities alone, on
genuine wounds profitably made into petrified foundations of identity. It would look like
making sustained efforts to look at oneself and at the same time hear the complex
polyvocality of (post)colonial human suffering. In the case of Europe, well underway in
the course of being provincialized in the emerging polycentric planetary constellation of
power, and in the case of Europe as a lived geopolitical and sociocultural reality, the
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ethical activity of naming through the lens of memoria passionis looks like challenging
codewords, shorthands, figures, no-longer-noticed metaphors, and desires precisely
whenever and wherever they seem to be so paradigmatically appropriate and so
enchantingly transparent. And no, Europe as a historical entity and as the existential
actuality for victors and victims is neither das Herz Europas alone nor the Bible and
Greeks alone. If this bottomless ambiguity is not remembered – especially when
postcolonial constructions of difference and identity are produced with “lightness” about
Europe, or Asia, or Africa or whatever other messy historical reality happens to be under
the theoretical magnifying glass – then the flights of theoretical virtuosity do come
treacherously close to being, ipso facto, the construction of victimhoods that devour its
actual historical victims. This is something that neither entrenched theory nor banal
religion can alleviate; memoria passionis as an ethical comportment toward the
polyvocality of suffering, however, can at least try.
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